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Michigan's Attempt at Curbing Drunk Drivers 
Under The Fourth Amendment: 
The Constitutionality of Sobriety Checkpoints 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court recently expanded the 
doctrine of warrantless searches. 1 The area of warrantless 
searches is confusing and often irrationaV and the Court's 
decision in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz only 
adds to the tangled web of confusion. In referring to this 
area, Justice Powell stated that the Court "cannot agree 
even on what it has held previously, let alone on how these 
cases should be decided."3 The Sitz case is no exception. 
This Note discusses how the Court misapplied the bal-
ancing test established in Brown v. Texas4 by undervaluing 
the nature of the intrusion and by exaggerating the law en-
forcement need to use sobriety checkpoints to prevent drunk 
driving.5 This Note does not deny the immense social costs 
drunk drivers cause, nor does it slight the government's 
effort to prevent the tragic loss of lives on our public high-
ways. This Note does, however, agree with Justice Stevens 
conclusion that the Sitz decision is "driven by nothing more 
than symbolic state action-an insufficient justification for 
an otherwise unreasonable program of random seizures."6 
The Court set its sights on the wrong symbol-"the illusory 
prospect of punishing countless intoxicated motorists"-when 
the focus should have been on privacy rights. 7 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .''8 Prior to 
1. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990). 
2. A majority of the Supreme Court refers to the law of vehicle searches as 
"this troubled area." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817 (1982). 
3. Robbins v. California 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring), over-
ruled, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
4. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
!'i. Sobriety checkpoints are stops by patrol officers to detect individuals that 
are drinking and driving. 
6. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, ??? (1990) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
7. Id. 
R. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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1968, the Supreme Court considered arrests and seizures to 
be synonymous under the Fourth Amendment, but that has 
since changed.9 The difference between an arrest and a 
seizure now depends upon the scope of the intrusion. 10 An-
other difference is that an arrest or a seizure having the 
essential attributes of a formal arrest must always be based 
upon probable cause, 11 whereas some seizures, like a Terry 
stop, 12 require a lesser standard. 13 The reasonableness of 
a seizure is based upon whether probable cause exists. 14 
The Court allows seizures of persons so long as only a 
brief detention is involved. 15 In Brown, the Court enunci-
ated a balancing test to govern such searches. The Brown 
Court refined the prior tests by weighing the gravity of the 
public concern served by the seizure and the degree to 
which the seizure advances the public interest against the 
severity of the interference with individual liberty. 16 The 
objective standard of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, 
normally used in evaluating the constitutionality of any 
stop, only gives way to the balancing test under special 
circumstances. 17 In National Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab, the Court stated that special circumstances arise 
when the "intrusion serves special government needs, beyond 
the normal needs of law enforcement . . . ."H1 
9. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-210 (1979). 
10. See e.g., United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429, 435-36 (5th Cir. 1980). 
11. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981). 
12. "[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate 
manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior 
even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Terry v. Ohio, 392 
u.s. 1, 22 (1968). 
13. See Id. 
14. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963). 
Hi. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
16. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). The Court emphasized that a 
central concern in the balancing test is that the "privacy is not subject to arbitrary 
invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field." Id. 
17. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 6fi6, 665 
(1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
18. Von Raab, 4R9 U.S. at 665. Immigration checkpoints are necessary to dis-
cover illegal aliens. Smuggling illegal aliens does not impair the motorist's driving 
ability, but if a motorist is intoxicated his driving ability will be impaired. An 
intoxicated motorist can often be identified by his driving maneuvers, whereas a 
motorist carrying illegal aliens most likely cannot he spotted by observing driving 
patterns because he or she shows no sign of carrying illegal aliens. This would he 
an example of a special governmental need, beyond the normal needs of law 
enforcement. Without these permanent checkpoints, the government would he 
severely hampered in its enforcement. 
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Before Sitz, three important cases, involving investigato-
ry stops of motorists, employed a balancing test to deter-
mine whether the suspicionless stop of a vehicle was rea-
sonable. The cases are United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 19 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 20 and Delaware v. 
Prouse. 21 
The first two cases-Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-
Fuerte-were border patrol cases. These two cases contrasted 
the differences between roving patrols22 and permanent 
checkpoints. In both cases, the Court examined vehicle stops 
near the Mexican/United States border where agents ques-
tioned occupants about their citizenship and immigration 
status. In the first case, the Court determined that roving 
patrol stops by officers need to be based upon reasonable, 
articulable suspicion.23 The Court, in the second case, stat-
ed that stops at permanent checkpoints are reasonable even 
though based upon no individualized suspicion.24 In the 
third case, Prouse, the Court determined that random stops 
to check licenses and vehicle registration were more compa-
rable to roving patrol stops by the border patrol than to 
permanent checkpoints.25 The Court found that the physical 
and psychological intrusions caused by random stops to 
check documents are the same as roving patrol stops.26 
III. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz 
A. Facts 
Petitioners, the Michigan Department of State Police 
and its Director, organized a sobriety checkpoint pilot pro-
gram in 1986.27 In February of the same year, the Director 
appointed a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee, com-
posed of representatives of the state police, local law en-
forcement, prosecuting attorneys, and the University of Mic-
19. 422 u.s. 873 (1975). 
20. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
21. 440 u.s. 648 (1979). 
22. Roving patrols are random stops of motorists in the absence of specific 
articulated facts which justify the stop by indicating a reasonable suspicion. Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 651 (1979). 
23. Bngnoni-Punce, 422 U.S. at 881, 883. 
24. Martinez-Fuerte, 421-l U.S. at 562. 
25. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657. 
26. Id. 
27. Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 429 N.W.2d lHO, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 19R8). 
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higan Transportation Research Committee.28 The committee 
submitted guidelines for implementation and operation of 
the program. Included in the guidelines were procedures 
governing "site selection, publicity, and operation of the 
checkpoint which included briefing, scheduling, safety consid-
erations, motorist contact, staffing, and assignment of du-
ties."29 
When the checkpoints were set up, all vehicles were to 
be stopped upon reaching the checkpoint and the drivers 
"examined for signs of intoxication."30 If the officer found 
evidence of intoxication, the officer would direct the driver 
to another location at the checkpoint for further examina-
tion.:n If the more thorough examination showed the driver 
to be intoxicated, the officer would arrest the individual.32 
If the driver was not found to be intoxicated at either stage 
of the examination, the driver would be released.33 
Prior to the litigation, only one checkpoint operation had 
been conducted in Michigan. During the operation of the 
checkpoint, wherein 126 vehicles passed through in a one 
hour and fifteen minute time period, only two people were 
arrested.M Each vehicle passing through the checkpoint 
was delayed an average of 25 seconds.:l5 
The day before operation of the first checkpoint, Sitz 
and others filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief from subjection to sobriety 
checkpoints.36 Michigan agreed to suspend use of check-
points pending the outcome in court. The trial court held 
the Michigan sobriety checkpoint to be unconstitutional un-
der the Fourth Amendment.37 On appeal, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision finding 
the roadblocks unconstitutional seizures under both the 
28. !d. 
29. !d. 
ao. !d. 
:31. !d. 
:32. !d. 
a a. !d. 
:l4. !d. 
:Hi. "Two drivers were detained for field sobriety testing, and one of the two 
was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A third driver who druve 
through without stopping was pulled over by an officer in an observation vehicle 
and arrested for driving under the influence." Sitz, 496 U.S. at ???. 
:36. Id. 
:n Id. 
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United States and Michigan Constitutions.38 The Michigan 
Supreme Court denied Respondents' Application for Leave to 
Appeal, so they filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The 
United States Supreme Court did not consider whether the 
checkpoints violated the Michigan Constitution, but rather 
reversed by holding that the Michigan courts misapplied the 
Brown test. 39 
B. The Majority's Application of the Brown Test 
The Brown test weighs the gravity of the public concern 
served by the seizure and the degree to which the seizure 
advances the public interest against the severity of the in-
terference with individual liberty.40 
1. The state's interest in curbing drunk drivers on public 
highways 
Most people agree that drunk driving is a serious prob-
lem in the United States and that a state has an important 
interest in eliminating drunk driving. Statistics show that 
drunk drivers cause a death toll of over 25,000 and nearly 
one million personal injuries annually.41 Drunk drivers also 
cause more than five billion dollars in property damage per 
year.42 "For decades the Court has 'repeatedly lamented the 
tragedy."'43 
2. Effectiveness of the stop 
In evaluating the last element of the Brown test, the 
Court held that the Michigan Court of Appeals erred in 
their evaluation of the effectiveness of the stops.44 The 
Court stated that this requirement in Brown "was not 
meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the 
courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative 
88. ld. 
89. lei. 
40. Brown, 44:1 U.S. at .51. 
41. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 10.8(d), p. 71 (HJ87). 
42. lei. 
4:1. Sitz, 496 U.S. at ??? (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 4.59 U.S. 558, 558 
(198:3)). 
44. ld. 
152 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with 
a serious public danger."45 Rather, the Court gave great 
deference to the elected officials to choose among the alter-
natives. 
3. The level of intrusion on the public's rights 
While the Court agreed that there is an important state 
interest in curbing drunk driving, the Court's decision ap-
pears to view the individual's interest as very minimal.46 
The Court evaluated the magnitude of the intrusion on 
individual's rights by considering two different 
standards-objective and subjective.47 Objective intrusion is 
measured by the duration of the stop.48 In Sitz, the dura-
tion of the stops was an average of 25 seconds. According to 
the Court, the stops were but a minimal intrusion according 
to the objective standard. 
Subjective intrusion is measured according to the per-
ception of the individual drivers.49 Some intrusions can gen-
erate concern, and even fear on the part of some drivers. 50 
The Court found the intrusion to be less than that generat-
ed by a roving patrol because the driver could see others 
being pulled over.51 
C. In an Effort to Make the Roads Safer, the Court Erred 
in Its Application of Brown 
When officers detain a person for identification or ques-
tioning, they perform a seizure of the person subject to the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.52 The Fourth 
Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including 
seizures that involve only brief detention.53 When the gov-
ernment intentionally terminates freedom of movement, a 
seizure, albeit brief, results. 54 The reasonableness of sei-
45. ld. 
46. ld. 
47. ld. 
48. ld. 
4!!. Id. 
50. ld. 
51. Id. 
52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
58. Davis v. Mississippi, 894 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1, 16·19 
(1961:1). 
54. Brower v. County of Inyo, 4H9 U.S. fi98, fi97 (19H9). 
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zures depends upon balancing the interest of the public with 
the individual's right to be free from arbitrary interference 
by law enforcement officials.55 
1. The Brown court's balancing test 
In Brown, the officers observed two individuals in an 
alley. 56 Because the officers believed the situation to be 
suspicious and one of the individuals had never been seen 
by the officers, the officers stopped him.57 The individual 
was asked to identify himself and to explain what he was 
doing in the area. Mter refusing to identify himself, the po-
lice arrested the individual according to a Texas statute.58 
Following the arrest, the officers searched the individual but 
found nothing. A Texas court convicted the individual for 
refusing to give his name to the police officer.59 
The officers, in support of their detention of the indi-
vidual, stated that the area is frequented by drug users and 
is a high crime area.60 They also stated that it is unusual 
for people to be in alleys.61 Because of these factors, the 
officers detained the individual under a Texas statute which 
allows an officer to obtain the identity of an individual. The 
statute is designed to advance a compelling social 
objective-prevention of crime.62 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's 
ruling, finding it an unconstitutional seizure. The Court 
held that, when a seizure is less intrusive than a tradition-
al arrest, the lower courts must balance between the public 
interest and the individual's right to personal security free 
from arbitrary interference by the state.63 While balancing, 
courts must also consider how the seizure advances the 
public's interest.64 The Court went on to state that a sei-
55. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878. 
56. Brown v. Texas, 44::1 U.S. 47, 48 (1979). 
57. !d. at 49. 
58. !d. (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN., Tit. 8, § 38.02 (a) (West 1974) makes it a 
criminal act for a person to refuse to give his name and address to an officer "who 
has lawfully stopped him and requested the information."). 
59. !d. at 50. 
60. !d. at 49. 
61. !d. at 52. 
62. !d. 
6::1. !d., at 50. 
64. !d. at 51. 
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zure, without probable cause, "must be carried out pursuant 
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the 
conduct of individual officers."65 The Texas statute failed 
this test. 
a. Public concern over the problem of drunk 
driving. The first prong of the Brown test looks at the 
gravity of the public concern.66 Drunk driving causes many 
deaths on the highways. However, significant progress has 
been made in reducing the number of alcohol related high-
way fatalities and injuries. For example, in 1988 there were 
18,501 traffic fatalities involving legally intoxicated persons. 
The number of legally intoxicated drivers killed in these 
crashes was 10,210, leaving 8,291 non-drivers killed in the 
accidents. "The portion of fatally injured drivers who were 
legally intoxicated dropped from 43.8% in 1982 to 37.5% in 
1988."67 The number of intoxicated drivers involved in fatal 
accidents has dropped in all age groups. 68 All of these im-
provements69 have been achieved without checkpoints or 
with minimal use of checkpoints. 
b. The degree to which se~zures advance public 
interest. The second element of the test is the degree to 
which seizures advance the public interest. 70 This element 
of the Brown test was the central focus of the lower courts 
in Sitz. Justice Stevens stated in his dissent that courts 
need to look at the net benefits of the program, for exam-
ple, the long-term effects and the costs of obtaining the 
arrests, instead of always looking at the gross receipts, 
65. ld. 
66. Id. 
67. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM 1988 6 (Dec. 1989). "The less 
alcohol, the less likely there will be an injury or fatality. Further, fatally injured 
drivers show higher alcohol levels than surviving drivers in all types of crashes 
and time periods." Brief of Amicus Curiae, MADD at 8, Michigan Dep't of State 
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (No. ????) (favoring petition for Writ of Certio-
rari to the Michigan Court of Appeals) (citing NATIONAL CENTER OF STATISTICS AND 
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION/NATIONAL HH:HWAY THAFFIC SAFE-
TY ADMINISTRATION, ''DRUNK DRIVING FACTS" (Date '??)). 
68. Id. 
69. "[T]he National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimates that an 
additional 5,000 lives per year would he saved if the 21 States without mandatory 
safety belt usage laws were to enact such legislation-even though only fiO% of mo-
torists obey such laws." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, ??? 
n.2 (1990). 
70. Brown, 448 U.S. at 47. 
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initial number of arrests. 71 If a business were to look only 
at gross receipts, all businesses would appear profitable. 
Most state decisions viewed in this light would also look 
advantageous. Only by comparing expenses to returns can a 
true measurement of a program's success be obtained. 
From the outset of the program, Michigan's justification 
for the checkpoints was their deterrent effect, rather than 
the number of arrests facilitated. 72 Because of the exten-
sive publicity initially given to Michigan's program, check-
points may have some short-term effect on drunk driving 
statistics. However, long-term effectiveness of the program 
will only be achieved if the public perceives an increased 
risk of being arrested. 73 Once the public learns that there 
is only a slight risk of being arrested, any deterrent effect 
will end.74 The deterrent effect of the checkpoints will also 
decrease as the media coverage is reduced, and as people 
realize that they can avoid the checkpoints by turning 
around. Short-term gains are no justification for an intru-
sion into an individual's rights. 
The Michigan checkpoint program was patterned after a 
program used in Maryland. 75 Maryland's program illustrat-
es the uselessness of sobriety checkpoints. Of the 125 check-
points conducted with 41,000 motorists passing through, the 
state arrested only 143 persons-only .3% of drivers 
stopped. 76 This rate is even less than the rate achieved in 
Michigan's first checkpoint-1.5%.77 The figures for other 
states are roughly comparable to Michigan and Maryland. 78 
71. Sitz, 496 U.S. at ??? (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
72. Respondent's Brief at 25, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444 (1990) (No. 88-1897). 
73. ld. 
74. The Michigan trial court concluded: 
[S]obriety checkpoints cannot be expected to achieve any significant level 
of apprehending drunk drivers. This fmding, in the Court's opinion, essen-
tially undermines the whole theoretical basis for concluding that check-
points can be effective in deterring drunk drivers .... Once the public 
perceives the truth about the low chance of a drunk driver actually being 
apprehended in a sobriety checkpoint, it cannot reasonably be supposed 
that those who are inclined to drink and drive will perceive a sobriety 
checkpoint as a significant threat to their being arrested. 
Respondent's Brief at 26-27, Sitz (No. 88-1897). 
75. Sitz, 496 U.S. at '???. 
76. ld. 
77. Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
78. See, e.g., Ekstrom v. Justice Ct., 663 P.2d 992, 993 (Ariz. 1983) (5,763 cars 
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Checkpoints are, at best, simply unnecessary in the 
fight against drunk driving. The sheriffs of a number of 
counties testified that the most efficient use of police re-
sources in checking the evil of drunk driving was not 
checkpoints but patrol cars.79 "This testimony was corrobo-
rated by witnesses from the Michigan State Police, who 
testified that state police officers receive considerable train-
ing in detecting drunk driving characteristics and are highly 
skilled in detecting drunk drivers."8° Checkpoints do not 
decrease drunk driving, but result in decreased manpower to 
be used in normal patrolling for drunk drivers.81 
Even with the small number of resulting arrests, some 
argue, as the Court did implicitly, that it is better than 
none at all. 82 These advocates do not take into account the 
number of officers that checkpoints draw away from those 
who might have been on patrol.83 While the checkpoints 
may result in roughly a 1% arrest rate, there is no evidence 
that checkpoints are more effective at detecting and arrest-
ing drunk drivers. Supporters of checkpoints cannot even 
document a checkpoint's deterrent effect on drunk drivers. 
Yet, supporters advocate a program that infringes upon an 
individual's constitutional rights while patrolling does not.84 
The Guidelines authored by the Michigan Police Depart-
ment state that only one sobriety roadblock will be in oper-
ation on any given night. Extensive, advance publicity will 
be given in the target county.85 Because of the heavy con-
stopped, 14 arrests); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1803 (Cal. 1987) (283 
vehicles screened, no arrests); State v. Garcia, 481 N.E.2d 148, 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1985); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 488 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Mass. 1985) (503 cars 
stopped, eight arrests). 
79. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 184; Respondent's Brief at 18-19, Michigan Dep't of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (No. 88-1897) (Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 
80. Respondent's Brief at 19, Sitz (No. 88-1897). 
81. According to the 1987 Michigan Drunk Driving Audit Report, current Jaw 
enforcement techniques apprehend approximately 75% of drunk drivers. Brief of 
Amicus Curiae, MADD at 11-12, Sitz (No. ????) (citing 1987 Michigan Drunk Driv-
ing Audit Report). 
82. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, ???. 
8:3. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d 180. See e.g., State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174, 1187 (Kan. 
1983) (140 police hours consumed in obtaining only 15 arrests); Commonwealth v. 
Trumble, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1104-5 (503 cars stopped, eight arrests, 13 participating 
officers). 
84. An officer on patrol can only pull over a driver if the officer has probable 
cause that the driver is driving under the influence. 
85. Brief for the Respondent at 29, Michigan Dep't State Police v. Sitz, 496 
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centration of officers needed to man a checkpoint, police 
resources will be reduced elsewhere. This could suggest to 
drivers in other counties that their chances of being detect-
ed have been reduced. Thus, checkpoint programs might 
increase the number of drunk drivers because of the large 
number of officers used at the checkpoints. This is especially 
true if drunk drivers are allowed to bypass the checkpoint 
upon seeing it ahead of them.86 
Maryland also conducted a study to see if the number 
of accidents and fatalities decreased because of the deterrent 
effect of checkpoints.87 The study compared traffic accidents 
in a county using checkpoints with accidents occurring in a 
county (control county) without checkpoints.88 The results 
showed that accidents in the checkpoint county decreased by 
10%, while decreasing by 11% in the control county. Fatal 
accidents in the control county decreased from sixteen to 
three while in the checkpoint county fatal accidents actually 
doubled from the prior year.89 Besides fewer arrests for 
drunk driving,90 the checkpoints do not show any decrease 
in the problem that the majority says is of such great con-
cern to the public-alcohol related traffic accidents. The 
decrease in the number of accidents and the number of 
fatalities are the result of other factors, not drunk driving 
checkpoints. 91 
The Court has effectively eliminated this step, the de-
gree to which the seizure advances the public interest, by 
stating that it is not the Court's responsibility to second 
guess which law enforcement techniques a state uses.92 
The Court believes this should be left to the political pro-
cess. 
While the Court should give some deference to the 
states, complete deference is not wise. Complete deference to 
the state would result in inefficient law enforcement tech-
niques. The effectiveness requirement in the Brown test 
U.S. 444 (1990) (No. 88-1897). 
86. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 184-185. 
87. !d. at 184. 
88. !d. 
89. !d. 
90. Ann M. Overbeck, A Sobering Look at the Constitutionality Of DUI Road-
blocks, 54 CIN. L. REV. 579, 593 n.llO (1985). 
91. See e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at ??? n.2. 
92. !d. at ???. 
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provides a check on inefficient law enforcement techniques. 
The reasoning applied by the Court allows states to intrude 
into an individual's rights while trying to cure other societal 
problems. In 1986, about 19,257 murders and non-negligent 
manslaughters occurred.93 The majority of these deaths 
were caused by firearms and knives. States have an interest 
in decreasing these numbers, especially when they are 
greater than the number of innocent individuals killed on 
the public highways.94 Under the Sitz analysis, the state 
could stop individuals in a high crime area and at their 
discretion question the individual. 
As mentioned earlier, in Brown, the area where the 
appellant was stopped had a high incidence of drug traffic 
and the police had never seen the appellant in the area 
before. After refusing to identify himself, the police arrested 
the appellant and he was convicted of refusing to give his 
name to a police officer. The purpose of the statute was to 
prevent crime and the state believed that this was an effec-
tive means. The Supreme Court found this application of 
the Texas law unconstitutional because the law allowed for 
seizures by officers without reasonable suspicion.95 This 
Court might have reached a different result, if instead of 
random stops of individuals, the police had stopped all peo-
ple in the area. The state could have argued that the indi-
vidual was in a high crime area and that they were trying 
to stop the passage of drugs within the community. By 
questioning a person as to his purpose in the area, the 
officer was enforcing the state interest of keeping out the 
unwanted drug dealers. This type of program would be as 
effective as sobriety checkpoints and possibly have greater 
deterrence than a sobriety checkpoint. When the state can 
show an important state interest, the Court appears willing 
to grant complete deference to the state legislature, if the 
Court considers the intrusion minimal. By giving great def-
erence to the state legislatures, the Court implicitly eradi-
cated the effectiveness prong of the Brown test. 96 
9:3. Sitz, 4~6 U.S. at ?'?? n.l7. 
94. Out of lH,fiOl alcohol related traffic fatalities, 10,210 of the fatalities were 
the legally intoxicated. Only 8,291 of those fatalities wore nonintuxicated indi-
viduals. This also doesn't take into account the number of accidents caused hy the 
nonintoxicated driver. Id. This is far fewer than the number of innocent people 
murdered and killed hy firearms each year. 
~fi. Brown, 44:1 U.S. 47, 48-4~ (1~79). 
96. The public also has an interest in alleviating the use of drugs because of 
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c. The severity of the interference with individual liberty. 
Individual suspicion has been the core component of Fourth 
Amendment protection against arbitrary government action.-
97 The state has at its disposal a large array of law en-
forcement weapons, yet the individual must rely upon the 
benevolence of the state or the courts to ensure that their 
rights are not trampled. By allowing cars to be stopped to 
prevent drunk driving, the Court subjects the public to 
potentially arbitrary harassment by police officers. Complete 
deference to the state does not fit within the framework of 
the Constitution.98 
The determination of the extent of the intrusion usually 
is divided into two components, the subjective and the ob-
jective nature of the intrusion.99 Based upon the short 
amount of time that each car is required to stop, the trial 
court concluded that the objective intrusion was minimal. In 
evaluating the intrusiveness of the seizure, the Court must 
take into account the overall impact on legitimate traf-
fic. 1oo 
While considering the initial stop, the Court failed to 
truly consider the intrusiveness of the stop. The intru-
siveness of a checkpoint goes significantly beyond what is 
contained in a single, brief stop. If suspicionless stops are 
allowed, a number of results will necessarily follow which 
involve a substantial intrusion. First, after the automobile is 
stopped at the checkpoint, the officer may compel the occu-
pants of the car to get out. 101 Second, the occupants could 
be subjected to pat-down searches if an officer reasonably 
suspects that the person detained might be dangerous. 102 
the social harms they cause. Currently the government has appointed what is 
referred to as a "Drug Czar" to wage America's battle against drugs. Because of 
the high publicity of this public concern, the Court, according to its holding, would 
grant great deference to the state and federal government in enacting enforcement 
techniques. 
97. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979). 
98. The trial court discussed at length the inherent ineffectiveness of drunk 
driving checkpoints in terms of both arrests and deterrence. Only after the court 
concluded that roadblocks were ineffective in meeting any of the state's express 
and implicit goals did the trial court turn to analyzing other forms of law enforce-
ment. Deference should not be given to a state program that cannot and will not 
accomplish its purposes, and is extremely expensive to operate. 
99. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-59 (1976). 
100. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975). 
101. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977). 
102. !d. at 111-12. 
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Third, the officer could require the driver to produce his li-
cense or other vehicle documents. 103 If the occupant has to 
go to the glove compartment to get the documents, the 
officer will be able to view what is inside the glove com-
partment.104 
By requiring the officers to stop all cars, the program 
does limit the officer's discretion in choosing whom to sub-
ject to the initial stop. However, the discretion of the officer 
as to who is detained is unlimited. The officer could base 
his decision on a ruddy complexion, an unbuttoned shirt, or 
a speech impediment. This may be all that is needed to 
detain an individual. 105 
Of the 126 drivers who passed through the first check-
point, only two were detained for further examination and 
questioning. One of those drivers was arrested. Thus, after 
the initial stop, the motorist can, at the discretion of the 
officer, be subject to another round of questioning and test-
ing. Checkpoints are more intrusive than one is initially 
lead to believe. 
Because· of police officer discretion, a large number of 
innocent drivers are subject to very intense scrutiny. A 
Maryland study indicated that drivers subject to full-fledged 
investigations at a checkpoint are most likely to be com-
pletely innocent of drunk driving charges. 106 For example, 
a study conducted in North Carolina discovered that of the 
940 individuals detained for further questioning, only 290 
were arrested for drunk driving. A Delaware study produced 
similar results-only 231 individuals were arrested of the 
701 individuals detained. 107 The Court in evaluating the 
intrusion failed to take this into consideration. 
Despite the Court's assurance, this type of checkpoint is 
similar to the roving patrol struck down by the Court in 
Brignoni-Ponce because of its intrusion upon the public's 
Fourth Amendment rights. 108 As with roving patrols, fear 
and anxiety are an understandable reaction. First, the 
108. Texas V. Brown, 460 u.s. no (1988). 
104. !d. 
105. These are only a few of the factors that the officers in charge of the 
program stated could be used at the checkpoint to detain a motorist. Respondent's 
Brief at 88, Michigan Dep't State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (No. 88-1897). 
106. 
107. !d. at 85. 
108. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979). 
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checkpoints are usually a total surprise to drivers, despite 
the advanced publicity. 109 Second, the fear factor is height-
ened by the presence of a large number of officers, chemical 
testing equipment, and mobile booking and jail vans. 110 
This is an unsettling use of authority even to an innocent 
driver. Even if the driver knows the location of the check-
point, because of officer discretion, the possibility of pro-
longed questioning-even when innocent-is troubling. 
2. Comparison of Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte 
Because the checkpoints in Sitz do not resemble the 
checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court had to structure 
the Brown test to meet its needs. 
a. Permanent v. temporary. In Martinez-Fuerte, the 
Court limited its holding to "the types of stops described in 
the opinion, permanent checkpoints. '[A]ny further deten-
tion . . . must be based on consent or probable cause."'111 
The Court had good reason to limit the holding to only 
permanent checkpoints. 
(1) Notice and surprise. Most of the stops at per-
manent checkpoints take place during the day, whereas 
sobriety checkpoints are almost always operated at night. 
Surprise is the key to a sobriety checkpoint, 112 whereas 
the permanent checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte was to provide 
an obstacle to using the main highways to ferret illegal 
aliens into the United States. 113 A seizure followed by an 
interrogation and even a cursory search at night is more 
intrusive and offensive than a daytime stop that is almost 
as routine as going through a toll gate or the fruit 
checkpoints in California. The motorist knows that the chec-
kpoint is there, what to expect at the checkpoint, and what 
to do at the checkpoint. 
109. The guidelines only provide for notice of the target county, not the road 
that the checkpoint will be placed on. Also, one-half of the people further detained 
by the checkpoints are innocent. These two factors provide the driver with an 
unsettled feeling upon the sudden appearance of the checkpoint. 
110. Respondent's Brief at as, Sitz (No. 88-1897). 
111. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 54a, 567 (1976). 
112. The surprise occurs because the driver has no knowledge of the location of 
the checkpoint or what to expect. In Michigan, publicity only revealed the targeted 
county. The publicity did not reveal the road upon which the checkpoint would be 
located. 
11:1. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557. 
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Unannounced, investigatory seizures, particularly at 
night, are typical of governments far different from our de-
mocracy. Justice Jackson, soon after returning from the 
Nuremberg Trials in France, stated: 
These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not 
mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of in-
dispensable freedoms. Among the deprivation of rights, 
none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the 
spirit of the individual, and putting terror in every heart. 
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and 
most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary 
government. 114 
(2) Immigration checkpoints are more necessary 
than sobriety checkpoints. Immigration checkpoints are 
necessary to discover illegal aliens. 115 Smuggling illegal 
aliens does not impair the motorist's driving ability, but if a 
motorist is intoxicated his driving ability will be im-
paired.116 An intoxicated motorist can often be identified 
by his driving maneuvers, 117 whereas a motorist carrying 
illegal aliens most likely cannot be spotted by observing 
driving patterns. A checkpoint is needed because of the lack 
of alternatives in spotting motorist smuggling illegal aliens. 
Alcohol related fatalities are more susceptible to reduc-
tion by public information campaigns than are crimes such 
as smuggling or armed robbery. An intoxicated individual is 
his own worst enemy. As mentioned earlier, the majority of 
fatalities are the intoxicated drivers themselves. If the risk 
of serious personal injury to the body does not deter the 
114. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, ??? n.9. (quoting 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 278-274 (1973) (quoting Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
115. Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in the United States vary 
widely. In 1972, conservative estimates put the figure at 1 million and two years 
later the estimate was revised upward to around 12 million aliens illegally in the 
United States. Eighty-five percent of the illegal aliens in the United States are 
from Mexico. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 8n, H78-79 (1974). The 
number of illegal aliens continues to grow and strain resources needed in detecting 
them. 
116. If a motorist's intoxication did not significantly impair his driving ability, it 
would not he illegal. 
117. Witnesses from the Michigan State Police testified that officers receive sub-
stantial training on how to identify drunk drivers and are very skillful in detecting 
and arresting the drivers. Respondent's Brief at ::!0, Michigan Dep't State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (No. H8-1897). 
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drivers, then it is doubtful that checkpoints will be much of 
a deterrence. 
In Martinez-Fuerte, the checkpoints were designed to 
prevent inland movement. 118 The checkpoints do succeed in 
apprehending some illegal immigrants and smugglers, but 
they also deter movement of others by threatening appre-
hension and increasing the costs of illegal transportation. 
Thus, besides the arrests, the checkpoints act as a deterrent 
because of increased costs of transportation. Checkpoints 
used to detect drunk drivers do not have any long lived 
deterrent effect. 119 
b. More like a roving patrol. The sobriety checkpoint 
more closely resembles the roving patrols that required 
reasonable suspicion. A motorist with advanced notice of the 
location of a permanent checkpoint has the opportunity to 
avoid the search entirely, or at least prepare for the search 
and limit its intrusion upon the motorist's privacy. The 
sobriety checkpoints can be placed anywhere the state police 
deem a need exists to try to curb drunk drivers. The possi-
bility exists that they can be placed anywhere on state 
roads just as a roving patrol could go anywhere on the 
state's roads; whereas, permanent checkpoints are always in 
the same place year after year. Checkpoints, despite their 
advanced publicity, are usually a total surprise to drivers. 
The physical and psychological intrusion visited upon 
motorists by a random stop by a roving patrol or a tempo-
rary checkpoint are no different. Both types of stops inter-
fere with freedom of movement, are inconvenient, and con-
sume time. Furthermore, both create substantial anxiety 
because neither are expected. The State of Michigan could 
announce that it was allowing roving patrol stops which is 
the same as announcing sobriety checkpoints, but still the 
Court would most likely find roving patrols unconstitutional. 
3. Discretion 
There is a great difference between the kind of discre-
118. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 878, 879 (1975) (referring to 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)). 
119. As drivers realize that there is very little chance of being caught, they will 
not be deterred from drinking and driving. Much of the program's deterrence is as-
sociated with the attention the media gives the program. As the media's interest 
wanes, as it always does, the program's deterrent effect will also decline. 
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tion an officer can exercise at an immigration checkpoint 
and the kind of discretion exercised at a sobriety checkpoint. 
Questions at an immigration checkpoint are for identification 
papers or driver's license. At a sobriety checkpoint, the offi-
cer has unlimited discretion in the type of questions that he 
can ask. Answers to those questions determine whether or 
not the motorist is subject to further examination and inter-
rogation at the second stop. 
The state's law enforcement officers also have consider-
able discretion in selecting a location for temporary 
checkpoints. This discretion allows states to also check for 
other illegal acts under the guise of a sobriety checkpoint. 
Thus, the officers are able to bypass other protections pro-
vided to individuals. 
4. No hinderance to law enforcement if decided the other 
way 
The 1985 task-force set forth thirty-five alternatives for 
combating alcohol related traffic accidents. 120 Sobriety 
checkpoints are only one of the alternatives suggested by 
the task force. The record in Sitz never mentions whether 
any of the other alternatives were even considered or imple-
mented. By declaring sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional, 
the Court would in no way hinder law enforcement efforts 
in deterring drunk drivers because other measures would be 
more effective. As was mentioned earlier, patrol cars result 
in more arrests and are also more efficient in deterring 
drunk driving. 121 The Court overvalues the law 
enforcement's interest by granting the professional politician 
complete discretion concerning how much of an intrusion is 
allowed by the programs it picks. 
5. The checkpoint was more like a publicity stunt by state 
officials 
The State of Michigan believed that one of the crowning 
achievements of the program was the media attention that 
120. Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
121. See Respondent's Brief at ao, Michigan Dep't State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444 (1990) (No. 88-1897) (indicating that officers are highly trained and very 
skillful in detecting and arresting drunk drivers); Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 184 (indicat-
ing that a number of Michigan county sheriffs testified that patrol cars are more 
effective at utilizing police resources to combat drunk driving). 
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sobriety checkpoints received. Lieutenant Cotton of the Mar-
yland State Police testified that the media coverage is over-
whelming. 122 Is this a justification for allowing an intru-
sion upon the rights of individuals? The words of Justice 
Scalia should be quickly remembered: 
The only plausible explanation, in my view, is what 
the Commissioner himself offered in the concluding sen-
tence of his memorandum to Custom Service employees 
announcing the drug program: "implementation of the drug 
screening program would set an important example in our 
country's struggle with its most serious threat to our na-
tional health and security." What better way to show that 
the Government is serious about its "war on drugs" than 
to subject its employees on the front line of the war to 
this invasion of their privacy and affront to their dignity. 
To be sure, there is only a slight chance that it will pre-
vent some serious public harm resulting from Service em-
ployee drug use, but will show to the world that the Ser-
vice is "clean," and-most important of all-will demon-
strate the determination of the Government to eliminate 
this scourge of our society! I think it is obvious that this 
justification is unacceptable; that the impairment of indi-
vidual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; 
that symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as 
the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an other-
wise unreasonable search. 123 
While the fight against drunk driving is laudable, the 
effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints is questionable. There is 
only a slight chance that sobriety checkpoints will prevent 
some serious public harm. The only justifiable reason for 
the program is the attention that the media is giving to the 
program which serves to show the public and the world that 
Michigan is concerned about drunk driving. What Michigan 
does not say is that sobriety checkpoints deprive individuals 
of their right against unreasonable searches. All this effort 
so that the government can be viewed as leading the cru-
sade against drunk drivers. This case is driven by nothing 
more than a symbolic government action-an insufficient 
justification for invasion into the private rights of others. 
122. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, ??? n.19 (1990). 
128. !d. (quoting Scalia, J., dissenting, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656, 705 (1989)). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
While the Court's, along with Michigan's, desire124 to 
make roads safer is praiseworthy, the Court has failed to 
follow its analysis announced in earlier decisions. The Court 
undermined the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals by 
concentrating only on the initial stop and failing to consider 
subsequent intrusions. Fourth Amendment rights, in this 
decision, appear to have become second class rights. The 
Fourth Amendment was designed to grant an individual a 
zone of privacy which could only be breached when the 
reasonable requirements of probable cause were met. Only 
in special circumstances, when the intrusion serves special 
government needs beyond the normal needs of law en-
forcement, does the probable cause standard give way to the 
balancing test of Brown. No special circumstances have 
arisen in regard to drunk driving which normal law enforce-
ment cannot solve. 
Instead, the Court, aroused by fears (perhaps even sup-
ported by the majority of citizens) of destruction on the 
highways, virtually eliminated the second prong: the degree 
to which the seizure advances the public interest, which 
provides a check against inefficient law enforcement tech-
niques. The result is a deprivation of an indispensable right 
for a program that does not obtain, nor will obtain even its 
stated objective. 
B. Gordon Beckstead 
124. "For decades, this Court has 'repeatedly lamented the tragedy."' !d. at 24R6 
(quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983)). See also, Breithaupt v. 
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) ("The increasing slaughter on our highways ... 
now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield."). 
